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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals filed 
November 4, 1994. (Addendum A) 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs, after some negotiation, sold and conveyed to the Defendants, Michael R. 
McCoy and Eugene E. Doms as tenants in common, certain property located in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah (Exhibit 1), The defendants closed the sale, paid a substantial amount on 
the purchase price of $276,750.00, and delivered to the plaintiffs a promissory note secured by 
a trust deed on the Park City property. (Exhibit 2) The note was in the amount of $194,250.00. 
The defendants failed to perform in accordance with the provisions of the promissory note and 
in due course an action to foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage was instituted. The payees on 
the promissory note and the beneficiaries of the trust deed were Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott, 
their wives not being a party to the financing transaction. (Exhibits 2 and 3) The defendant 
McCoy failed to answer the foreclosure complaint and his undivided one-half interest in the 
property was duly foreclosed and sold at sheriffs sale. The defendant Doms caused the default 
against him to be set aside and filed his answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim requested 
rescission based on fraud and on the doctrine contained in Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1984). During the trial the counterclaimant Doms abandon his claim of fraud. For more 
details and discussion of the facts please refer to attached Addendum A which are the facts set 
forth in the plaintiffs' brief, pages 6 through 11. 
ARGUMENT 
In Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 513 (Utah 1886), denying rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the standard for granting a petition for rehearing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case 
must be made. We must be convinced that the court failed to consider some material point in 
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions . . . ." In Cummings v. Nielson. 129 P. 619, 624 
(Utah 1913), the Court declared: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of right, and we 
have no desire to discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearing in proper cases. When this Court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material questions involved in the 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for unless we have 
misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may affect the result, 
or that we have based the decision on some wrong principle of 
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . if there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or other good reasons, 
a petition for rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
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meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized by this Court. 
The following sections of this petition will establish that, applying these standards, the plaintiffs' 
petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted because the Court has 
overlooked material issues of fact and misconstrued issues of law which should be decided in 
plaintiffs' favor. 
POINT I 
RESCISSION IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THIS IS AN 
EXECUTED CONTRACT RATHER THAN AN EXECUTORY 
CONTRACT. 
The case of Bergstrom v. Moore so heavily relied on by the defendant involved an 
executory contract wherein the court was able to determine that the contract could not be 
completed in accordance with its terms. However, the present case involves an executed 
contract. No preceding contract of purchase existed in this case. However, the Utah courts 
have time after time held that all representations are merged into the final document, which in 
this case is a deed. The doctrine of merger is well established in the State of Utah. See e.g. 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168. 169 (Utah 1977) (" . . . therefore, in such a case the deed 
is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and 
unenforceable.") See also Embassy Group v. Hatch. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah Ct. App 
1993). The violation of the terms of an executed contract give rise to an action for damages and 
not for rescission which if granted would destroy the contract including the basis for rescission. 
If the counterclaimant Doms has any action, it is only an action in contract for damages. 
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POINT II 
THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH FACTS THAT 
CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
THEREBY PROHIBITING A DECREE OF RESCISSION 
MANY YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT. 
In order to effect rescission, there must be a tender of the title to the plaintiffs. As 
indicated in Perrv v. WoodalL 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) "The law is well settled that one 
electing to rescind a contract must tender back to the other party whatever property of value he 
has received." Doms did not tender the property because he did not own it. The property had 
been transferred to Summit County Title Company as trustee (Exhibit 2) and thereafter to 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 16). Subsequently, as a result of the failure to pay real estate 
taxes, the property was sold to Summit County on May 27, 1987. At no time and even to the 
present date has Doms ever tendered the title to the plaintiff. Of course, he didn't have title; 
therefore, he obviously could not tender the same. (Refer to Reply Brief of Appellants, Point 
I, Section B, commencing on page 8.) This inability to tender title and the failure to tender 
obviously prejudices plaintiffs and destroys the basis for rescission. 
Doms knew of the encumbrances prior to the sale (Findings of Fact #43, Addendum #16 
to plaintiffs' brief). The sale was dated March 23, 1982 (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3). Answer and 
counterclaim was filed January 29, 1988, more than five years after taking possession and the 
amended counterclaim was filed January 15, 1988. (R 102-55) See attached Addendum C 
which outlines the time periods involved in this action. 
The plaintiffs owned 100% interest in the property and Doms acquired from them only 
an undivided one-half interest, and therefore, even if the one-half interest had been tendered, it 
wasn't sufficient to put the plaintiffs back in the position they were prior to the sale. Because 
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Doms could not and did not tender the total title to the plaintiffs, they were automatically 
prejudiced for they could not take any action to mitigate damages or cause the resale of the 
property. This constitutes some six years of prejudice. The whims and vagaries of the market 
were entirely under the control of the defendants to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs were further prejudiced by defendants' non-payment of real estate taxes. 
Although Defendant Doms had agreed to pay all taxes that accrued against the property, he 
failed to so do for more than four years. The property was sold at tax sale to Summit County. 
The tax sale vested the title to the property in Summit County, thereby making it impossible for 
Doms and/or McCoy to tender title to the plaintiffs. The tax sale also eliminated the plaintiffs' 
security interest in the property which prejudiced plaintiffs because the property secured a 
substantial promissory note. Defendants' failure to pay taxes caused the loss of the security. 
Prejudice to plaintiffs due to defendants extraordinary delay is also exemplified by the death of 
plaintiff D. C. Anderson. Mr. Anderson was the original developer of the property and the 
person who negotiated the sale of the property to Doms and McCoy. Anderson's death 
prejudiced the plaintiffs' position because he can no longer testify and thus the death has caused 
a loss of evidence. In support of its assertion that prejudice must be demonstrable, the court 
cited Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647 (Hawaii 1985). However, the court overlooked that 
portion of Small which specifically stated: 
A court of equity, therefore, will only consider a claim 
brought without unreasonable delay. Id. More explicitly, the 
court will entertain a suit if it has been "brought without undue 
delay after plaintiff knew of the wrong or knew of facts and 
circumstances sufficient to impute such knowledge to him: and the 
time lapse has not "resulted in prejudice to the defendant." Id. 
(citing 3 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence §528 (2d ed. 
1948)). Prejudice has been found, for example, where fading 
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memories or death has caused the loss of evidence, where changes 
in the value of the subject matter or in the defendant's position 
have occurred, and where there are intervening rights of third 
parties. Id. (citing W. McClintock, supra). And whether a claim 
is barred by laches is "determined by the circumstances of each 
particular case." Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. at 317, 25 S.Ct. 
at 36. 
701 P.2d at 657 (emphasis added). Several of the factors recited in Small are present in this 
case. 
In addition, since Doms and McCoy received full value for the property at the time they 
conveyed it to the corporation, Doms would receive a windfall and plaintiffs would be prejudiced 
if they now have to pay Doms a second time. Finding of Fact #34 (R. 6882) memorializes the 
fact that Doms and Anderson met before the purchase of the property. Plaintiff is prejudiced 
as Mr. Anderson's death precluded any testimony as to the formation of the contract. The 
Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr., 35 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), one of the 
cases cited in the court's opinion states: 
The existence of laches is one to be determined primarily by the 
trial court; and reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise 
of the trial court's discretion in the matter, unless it appears that 
a manifest injustice has been done or the decision cannot 
reasonable be found to be supported by the evidence. 
535 P.2d 1256 at 1260. The trial court heard evidence relating to the decreasing values of the 
real estate, the tax sale, and the various transfers. The record in this case, the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment are rife with examples of the prejudice that occurred to 
the plaintiffs by reason of the failure of the defendant to act. To ignore these findings and 
conclusions which developed from a hard-fought case results only in farther complicating an 
already difficult case, adding time, attorneys' fees and costs to both parties. 
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Plaintiff Scott is additionally prejudiced because Doms failed to file any action against 
Anderson's estate. Any such claim is barred and Mr. Scott is left with the entire obligation, 
which is certainly a matter of substantial prejudice to him as he must assume the entire burden. 
The court's opinion, in essence, states that the evidence showing depreciation of the value 
of the property of about 37% (R. 7825, 7937) is insufficient to create prejudice which would bar 
rescission. However, the court ignores the fact that the trial court stated that the evidence 
constituted sufficient prejudice to bar rescission. 
The record is replete with evidence of prejudice to the plaintiffs which should bar 
rescission. The passage of time, the death of D. C. Anderson, the tax sale, the foreclosure and 
sale of Mr. McCoy's interests and other events make it impossible to return the parties to the 
position they were prior to the sale of the property. This Court erred by failing to consider 
these circumstances all of which appear in the record. 
POINT m 
THIS COURT ALSO ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
PLAINTIFFS' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT. 
An action in rescission must be commenced within four years from the date that the party 
knows of the basis for the rescission. In this case, the trial court found that the parties were 
aware of the claimed encumbrances three months before the deed was executed; therefore, the 
statutory period started running on the date of the deed. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 
1984) states that rescission is an equitable action and is governed by the four-year statute of 
limitations in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25(2). Baker also states that when the party knows 
of problems the date of the recording of the deed sets forth the date for the commencement of 
the limitation period. 
7 
The court of appeals decision relates entirely to the rescission action and does not even 
address the statute of limitations question. Since the decision involved only the rescission, 
presumably the statute of limitations for rescission must be applied. The only reason not to 
apply the four-year limitation period would be if Doms could relate his claim back to the filing 
of the complaint by the plaintiffs. The original plaintiffs were only Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott 
who were the beneficiaries of the promissory note and the trust deed. The trial court found that 
the trust deed transaction was an entirely separate transaction from the conveyance. (R. 6890) 
Therefore, Doms' counterclaim cannot relate back to the filing of the complaint as it involves 
an entirely different transaction involving different parties. Rule 15c of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that the counterclaim must arise out of the same transaction. In the instant 
case, new parties (Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott) were added substantially after the statute of 
limitations had expired. Doms' counterclaim constituted a new cause of action unrelated to the 
plaintiffs' cause of action and added new parties. Under these circumstances the relation back 
doctrine does not apply as argued in Point II of appellants' opening brief. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED STATE V. 
CARTER AND, IN DOING SO, IGNORED ESTABLISHED 
PRINCIPLES OF UTAH LAW. 
The court of appeals relied on State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), as a basis for 
not ruling upon or considering issues raised by the plaintiffs/appellants. Carter permits an 
appellate court to avoid issuance of a written opinion on certain issues which the court finds are 
without merit only after the claims have been "carefully analyzed" and given a "fair and 
comprehensive" review by the appellate court. Carter, 776 P.2d at 889; Country Oaks 
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Condominium Management v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah 1993). Further, the "Carter 
doctrine" can be invoked only when the claims subject to the doctrine are meritless or of no 
effect. Carter, 776 P.2d at 889. Carter specifically interprets "meritless"claims to be those 
which involve "established principles" or those which have "in substance been previously urged 
upon this court and rejected." Id. 
In this case, the issues presented by plaintiffs/appellants which this Court has refused to 
address have not been "previously urged upon this court and rejected." Furthermore, where 
those issues, such as application of the statute of limitations, application of the relation back 
doctrine, validity of the deed and whether defendant Doms was a remote grantee and a real party 
in interest, involve "established principles" of law, those "established principles" dictate an 
outcome in favor of plaintiffs/appellants. In fact, in several of the enumerated instances, 
defendant/appellee presents no argument to contradict the issue. In other words, the court of 
appeals' application of Carter is not only totally inappropriate but by applying Carter, the court 
of appeals turns several "established principles" of Utah law upside down. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's memorandum opinion in this case discussed only one of the many issues 
raised by both sides. The court erroneously applied State v. Carter to avoid issues which have 
not been previously presented to it and which "established principles" of Utah law dictate should 
be decided in plaintiffs/appellants favor. 
Even the single issue discussed in the court's opinion, rescission, is discussed 
incompletely and without reference to specific evidence and findings contrary to the court's 
conclusion. For example, the court overlooked the fact that no tender of the property was ever 
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made by Doms — an obvious prerequisite for rescission. The court also ignored arguments by 
plaintiffs/appellants concerning the statute of limitations and the fact that Doms was not the 
owner of the property which would require dismissal of the rescission action. Finally, the court 
overlooked the numerous instances of prejudice to plaintiffs as disclosed to the trial court and 
found in the record. 
The court should rehear this case because it has not addressed the appropriate issues and 
has failed to apply the appropriate facts and law concerning limitation of actions in cases 
involving rescission. 
Submitted this £ > day of November, 1994. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
JRYING^. BIELE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Appellees 
I hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for 
purposes of delay. 
DATED this Ji day of November, 1994. 
:. 6IELE " " 
s for Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was either hand delivered or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid this 
<yt 5* clay of November, 1994. 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
Craig L. Boorman, Esq. 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
f.^/^^y 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Court of Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms. 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C, Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, and 
Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C* Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake 
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as 
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real 
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor 
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms; 
unknown defendants described as John 
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
MOV 0 h tSS1) 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
(Not For 
Publication) 
Case No. 920653-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 4, 1994) 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, 
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms 
Before Judges Rr lings, Greenwood, and Jacksoi 1. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's 
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his 
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the countei c 1 i in 
include whether the statute of limitations barred the 
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date 
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms 
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party 
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the 
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree 
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments be without merit. 
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d 
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal). 
I n j^Lg cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court 
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused 
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert 
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler. 
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter, 
v. Suaarhouse Shopping Center Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975) ; Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc., 
751 P. 2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish 
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted) ; 
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook. 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a 
substantial hardship on the State"). 
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay i n 
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to 
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases 
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense 
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988 
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not 
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles 
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Ci r. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not 
(continued...) 
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced 
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
trial court 
Norman H. Jackson-^Oudge 
WE CONCUR: 
fcPudith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge* 
reenwood/1 Judge 
1. (...continued) 
alone convert delay into laches); Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does 
not in and of itself convert delay into laches) ; Lincoln v. 
Fisher. 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959). 
A change in property value is one factor courts should 
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d 
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d 
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 1976). Further, other courts have determined that a change 
iji property value did not prejudice landowners because the change 
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a 
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop> 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985). 
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the 
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record 
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims 
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind 
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings 
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the 
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to 
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment 
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest 
i11 Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and 
any damages for breach of ti t,l e warranties. 
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ADDENDUM B 
April 17, 1990, and during the trial the motion was renewed and Doms elected to proceed on 
rescission.3 (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued amemoi andum decision 
in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 4244 et seq., Addendum 16) 
Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose of determining 
i: cumbrances existed and, if one was found, determining 
damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R 7753 et seq.) The bench 
trial was held n 1 ViiiiwiMI ,'"! Il Ml 1 in Miinh-i I  llll""»it ill r< nil KMIOI l l r firs! at five 
memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23, 
1992, the court issued its final Second Amended Findings and ( nm lu.sion* .mid SrcoiitJ Amended 
Judgment. (R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum 16) Appropriate objections to the findings and 
conclusions were made and accompanied by requests for additional findings and conclusions. 
( ddendum 1 Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-
6907) 
FACTS 
This case involves undeveloped real estate situated in Park City, Summit County, referred 
to as Rossi Hills. The property was owned 'by Dan Scoli unl l» 1" -Vndeison AS inianls in 
common. ( Exhibit 27) 4 
Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of himself 
3
 On December 19, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a related action against the defendants and 
Summit County seeking to set aside a tax sale, Case #10066 (Supp.R. 1-66) The court 
consolidated the case and determined the tax sale was void. 
4
 All exhibits referred to 1 1 illllii11 I nrl wnr mlmiiinl ,11 11 ill I'\li(hii lisK air mnlanicd 
in R7081-82 and R437-38. 
6 
and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) Negotiations proceeded and in 
due course the property was sold for a purchase price of $2 7(\ I'Si) 00 on I cm is and u vul\ nig 
parlies tiifTaio" from (he Imal earnest money agreement. (Exhibits 1 & 69) The sale was 
consummated and a deed was executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and ] 
Aiiilci'M mi iii Il hi1 will Mini ,\i IN In'viiii .m M.iiilnis mi l,mn of Doms and McCoy, as grantees, 
each with an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1; Addendum 1) The sale was completed 
pursuant to a tnr.ci: : . * * 
allocation thereof. (Exhibit 69) On the March 982, Doms and McCoy executed a trust 
deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 in tavor * /\nuersoi f 
interest, ; : d Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half interest." (Exhibit 3; Addendum 2) The 
note called for interest at the rate of 14% unless Doms and McCoy defaulted, in which case the 
iiueresi unit HI mi I i in H MII nnir vus a trust deed executed by Doms and 
McCoy on the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson. (Exhibit 2; Addendum 3) Neither 
Ellen Anderson, nor Jejune So»lf "i» I I ,m Mlii " m Ihc pinpi i"\ ri \\;v • ,mv i) .is IvuHn i.if v 
of either the trust deed note or the trust deed. 
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified thai lie and hour, uulkoil Ilii: piopeih in 
advance of the sale and observed the loop road and the other features later claimed to be 
undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that the property was not covered by snow 
i"'I ll - il '""<, i liiiincif encroachments were plainly visible. (R. 7653, 7658, 7661, 7662, 7663, 
7664, 7667, 7686; Addendum 18) 
purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and 
McCoy created a corporation called Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 31; Addendum 5) The 
7 
first meeting of directors was held on November > _ , where stock certificates were issued 
to Doms and McCoy (Exhibit 32; Addendum < ^e corporation held annual meetings for 
tlr vcars 1*W (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 (Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through 
Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business in of Utah as indicated by their 
-) 
On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy Enterprises. 
(Exhibit 16; Addendum ll Shnrll\ Uiani'tlri , |)oni< ny iIryHi»|tnl ;i IOIHI M iiliiir :ii»ianinii lor 
the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 81, 82) 
From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, and 
in due course a tax sale was conducted. (Notice of Final Tax Sale Exhibit 5 to the Complaint 
in consolidated case #10066.) 
admitted to probate, and his widow, 
Ellen Anderson, was appointed personal representative on November 30, 1982. She filed and 
published the required i'1- Jul HHI )"'« "»' i him JuaiiM <h< * • t;ii<- .ind 
the time for filing claims expired long before this action was instituted. (R. 7988; Addendum 
13) 
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note and 
thus, defaulted under the note. (Exhibit 6) 
On June 5, 1985, Anderson's estate and Scott instituted an action to foreclose their trust 
deed. (R. 1-9) Pursuant to the trust deed and provisions of the Utah Code, plaintiffs elected to 
considerable negotiation 
between the attorneys for both sides, defaults were taken and default judgment entered. (R. 34-
8 
40) Subsequently, the default and judgment against Doms were set aside. (R. 64-6) 
After entry of the default judgment and before it was set aside, Doms filed an answer and 
a counterclaim for rescission only on January 29 , 1988. (R. 41-44) In D o m s ' Certificate of 
Compliance to the Order Setting Aside the Judgment, he agreed that all filings by h im were 
d l ee i ivc w* i HI Iiiiiir I I r> R S ml11 "Yi nH Vddendum 21) After the default judgment had been 
set aside, on June 15, 1988, Doms filed an amended counterclaim requesting rescission only. 
11s IU 11 inihiiih. iliiTealki Inn ml ,I SUOIKI iiiiniijcil nmiik n l.mit in|urstint?, rescission ;nid 
damages for loss of profits and fraud. (R. 237 et seq.) 
On August 2 -1 , 1988, Summit Count} sold R ossi I I l l s in a tax sale tc • D c m :: • :>> < n 
August 26, 1988, more than three years after the complaint was filed and more than six years 
after the original deed to Doms and McCoy, Doms obtained a deed from Domcoy. (Exhibit 17) 
t of the foreclosure action, Doms could claim some 
type ownership or of title in the Rossi Hills property A t the time Doms asked for 
. - - > ' acqi lire e\ en 
- _ J : -i uii. August 26, 1988, one month after filing the seconded amended 
counterclaim. 
Domcoy Enterprises had been involuntarily dissolved on December 31, 1986 (Exhibit 39; 
Addendum 7), approximately two years before the deed in fav or of Doms was executed. 
(Exhibit 17; Addendum 8) The deed executed by the corporation was executed by Doms acting 
only as an officer (not a director) of the corporation despite the fact that the charter had been 
of Doms himself. (Exhibit 17; Addendum 8) 
Doms' claim for rescission was tried to the district couiI The court held that the 
9 
contract could not be rescinded. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) The court further determined that 
the election to pursue rescission did not constitute an election of remedies and a trial would 
proctvJ ni -i Lili i Jalc to determine damages for violating the deed covenant against 
encumbrances. (R 7757) Six years and four months had expired before these unrelated causes 
cil ..tiliuii vrnii1 (ml I! Ihriclnn nl.niilil'ts iinmol Ikil Hit1 sliitute of limitations had expired. (R. 
3421-25) Nevertheless, the district court held that under U.R.C.P. Rule 15(c), Doms' unpled 
cause of action ) 
After trial, the district court concluded that "the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust 
Deed do not constitute a single contract" contradicting the basis for its earlie r ruling relating 
to the transactions and applying Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P. (R. 6890) The court also determined that 
Doms, who was a remote grantee of the property by reason of the purported purchase of the 
Ko; damages icli n| Hie covenant against 
encumbrances contained in the prior deed to Doms and McCoy who had divested themselves of 
Rossi Hills, <i mil In. lit Hi.ill MIH h ILIUMI'I S uniilld he sctolf in In el, ill JIMIIISI the 
purchase price of the property that was sold ten years prior to the determination of damages and 
all of the purchase and financing contracts should be revised to reflect this setoff, thoi igh Doms 
only acquired a one-half interest. 
Plaintiffs were required to institute an action against Summit County to set aside the tax 
determine its invalidity. If the sale was valid, then plaintiffs' rights to foreclose the 
trust deed would be eliminated as title would vest in Summit County free of any claim of prior 
#10066, \ • nnsolidated into this case T'he court, 
on hearing the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, determined that the tax sale was invalid, 
10 
thereby reconfirming the title to Rossi Hills in Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. subject to the trust 
deed in favor of Anderson and Scott. (U f »M% /()(>4), I lie action was instituted and conducted 
\ attorneys for the plaintiffs in order to protect themselves and Doms and McCoy from 
being divested of all interest in the property by reason of the failure of the defendants to pay the 
t 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appropriate 
and the parties to this action substantial time and expense. 
Plaintiffs first assert that Doms' counterclaim was i >. 
Doms' initial answer and counterclaim was filed just two months before the expiration of the six-
year limitations period. However, default judgment against Doms had been entered before the 
answe r i nd : ounterclaim an :i his Certificate of Compliance with the order setting aside the 
default judgment specifically stated that the answer and counterclaim would not be officially 
accepted until a date wliiili \\ i. iillni ilir lApiialinii nil! lillui liiml.ilinii< primd Subsequent 
counterclaims made by Doms were outside the limitations period. 
Plaintiffs allege that the trial court's implied hokii : d 
back to plaintiffs' original complaint is erroneous. Doms' counterclaim concerned a different 
transaction than plaintiffs' original complaint I furthermore, the counterclaim involved parties 
iiH i.Tiwiped in the original action. The trial court did not apply the correct standards in 
determining whether the counterclaim related back to the original complaint. 
i Ma ml 11 f "• \ i >i ml i .1 11 in mi i in .11 i • i in in 1 i | p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a s e c o n d t r i a l o n t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s 
after Doms had elected the remedy of rescission and failed. The doctrine of election of remedies 
11 
ADDENDUM C 
n igyyy vwfc,w* 
Anderson & Scott v. Doms & McCoy 
Statute of Limitations 
K 
Oct-Nov.1981 
Dams inspected 
and had actual notice 
of encumbrances 
(Findings of Fact #33, 
3Ml,fiaiul43). 
March 23, 1985 
Three-Year 
Statute of 
Limitations 
on Fraud 
Claim expired. 
Jan 21,1988 
Default 
Judgments 
entered. 
March 23,1986 
Four-vear 
Statule of 
Limitation on 
Rescission 
expired. 
IJan 29,1988 
Answer and 
Counterclaim 
for rescission 
filed but not 
effective as 
J judgment is 
In effect 
(R 41-44) 
March 23,1988 
Six-Year Statute 
ofLimitations 
on Contract 
Claim expired. 
June 1,1968 
Doms files certificate 
of compliance agreeing 
that the effective date 
for the acceptance of 
the Answer & Counter^ 
claim is June 1,1988 
(R-76-78Addedum21 
to brief). 
June 15,1988 
Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim 
(Requested only 
Rescissions ana 
Lost Profits), 
'81 82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 1988 
Mardi 22,1982 
Sale closed. Deed 
recorded. Trust 
deed delivered 
(Exhibits 1,2-69), 
I June 6,1985 
Mr. Anderson 
and Mr Scott 
file complaint 
to foreclose 
Trust Deed 
as mortgage* 
July 5,1988 
Court signed order authorizing joinder 
oiMrs. Anderson and Mre> Scott 
as Lnvoluntary plaintiffs. 
Order authorizing filing of Second 
Amended Counterclaim and the fifing thereof, 
• 1st Oaim. Rescission (titing Bergstrom v. Moore) 
conditioned on tender crfproper^ to plaint^ 
•2nd Gaim. Lost Profits (Doms abandoned this 
claim (R-79 27-30). 
•3rd Claim. Fraud (Doms consented to dismissal 
of this claim (R-7763-64) and waived any right to 
consequential damages (R-7971) or damages that I 
arise by reason of "spedaT being placed on deed 
Aug. 20,1988 
Doms Received 
deed from Domcoy 
(First time he 
obtains title) 
-{Exhibits 11 &66). 
